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Welcoming the Dragon: The Role of Public Opinion in Russian Internet
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1. The Russian Internet under regulatory attack
Russian internet policymakers and regulatory authorities had a busy year in
2014. Among other things, new regulatory initiatives this past year included a
requirement for the registration of popular blogs and a law that prohibits keeping data
on Russian citizens on servers outside Russian territory.1 This was followed by a
discussion around creating an independent national segment of the Internet. The idea
of establishing a “sovereign Internet” appeared on the agenda before a meeting of the
Russian Security Council dedicated to the Internet and led by President Putin.2
President Putin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov explained that the discussion was
needed because “crazy voices may demand the disconnection of Russia from the
Internet” as part of sanctions against Russia, particularly in light of the fact that “the
major administrator of the World Wide Web is the U.S.”3
Later, officials denied that there was any intention to disconnect Russia from
the global network, although they argued that there is a need to prepare for possible
aggression against Russian information infrastructure and to make this more
independent of external actors.4 According to the Russian Ministry of
Communication, one of the organizations that could possibly isolate Russia from the
Internet is ICANN.5 Russian minister of communication Nikolay Nikiforov promised
to protect Runet from external aggression.6 Following this statement, Russian media
revealed that the ministry is planning to develop an autonomous Internet
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infrastructure including Russia-based root Domain Name System servers and a
Russian national Routing Information system.7
Despite the welcome news that Russia has not yet disconnected itself from the
global network, many experts point out that Runet is becoming more and more
regulated. Prominent blogger and Internet entrepreneur Anton Nosik suggested that
new Russian legislation might soon bring “the last day of the Russian Internet.”8
KremlinRussia, a well-known political satire blog, published “Runet’s will” in
preparation for the death of the Russian Internet.9
While Runet is not yet dead and people can still express their opinions online,
the authorities have at their disposal a broad menu of tools and a legislative
framework that allows them to censor almost any type of content, ban websites, or
prosecute Internet users. In addition, some of the major Internet companies like
Yandex and Vkontakte (whose founder, Pavel Durov, has left Russia) have
experienced changes in their leadership and ownership which can be considered part
of the authorities’ efforts to gain more control over the major actors in this field.
2. Russian public opinion on Internet regulation
Most of those concerned about the increasing limitations on Internet freedom
in Russia have dedicated special efforts to monitoring the activities of the Russian
authorities. Initiatives to protect Internet freedom and oppose regulation are focused
on the institutions that are introducing this regulation, whether they are the President’s
administration, parliament, or the courts. Some are speaking out against the new
regulation, but there are limited measures against the Russian regulation juggernaut.
Is attention to these regulatory institutions helping to curtail the assault on
Internet freedoms, or, at least, to slow it down? Are state institutions the core of the
problem? Many discussions around Internet freedom suggest an inherent assumption
that Internet regulation, censorship, or any repressive measures aimed at online spaces
happen against the will of the people in general and against Internet users in
particular. This argument, however, requires further analysis and consideration.
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A recent poll by the Levada Center suggests that 54% of the Russian
population supports the opinion that the Internet includes many dangerous websites
and therefore should be censored, while 32% argue that the threat is overestimated
and there is no place for censorship. In response to a question about attitudes on a law
that will limit the access of Russian users to the global network, 37% expressed
varying degrees of negative feelings, 15% were supportive, while 38% were neutral
and expressed no interest in the issue.10
Recently, the Annenberg School’s Center for Global Communication Studies’
Internet Policy Observatory (IPO) together with Russian Public Opinion Research
Center (VCIOM), released a survey of 1,601 respondents that probed deeper into the
attitudes of Russian users toward Internet regulation.11 According to the survey, 59%
of Russian Internet users saw no association between Internet regulation and their
own personal freedom, while 41% thought Internet regulation negatively impacted
their freedom. Additionally, 48% percent of Internet users believed that shutting down
the Internet for a limited period could be justified in a case of a national emergency
and 9% in a case of mass protests, while 43% opposed such a temporary shut-down.12
The IPO’s survey also includes an investigation into what type of online content is
considered by Russian respondents to be undesirable. While only 5% thought that
information threatening political stability should be censored, 45% argued that foreign
news-media websites should be censored. When questioned about more specific
examples, however, 59% said that websites with content concerning homosexuality
should be blocked, 46% supported blocking social networking groups organizing antigovernment protests and 43% supported blocking personal blogs that call for regime
change.13 In addition, 70% of respondents supported the idea that all personal
websites should be registered with the Ministry of Communication. Interestingly, the
security services, followed by the Russian government, were considered the most
trusted institutions that should be responsible for regulation and censorship.14
In light of the substantial support for political censorship, it should come as no
surprise that people in Russia were not ready to actively oppose regulation. Only 9%
10
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of Internet users said they would consider participating in protests against Internet
restrictions.15 Furthermore, the only type of Internet censorship that a sizable number
of Internet users said would mobilize them to participate in protests was a complete
ban on the use of the Internet such as exists within the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea (i.e. North Korea).16 The prohibition of online political activity and the total
prohibition of anonymity were each considered a reason for protest by 7% of Internet
users.17 In other words, the potential for protest on these issues is extremely low.
3. Public opinion and multistakeholderism in Internet governance
One of the dominant approaches in Internet governance suggests that if
institutional actors try to increase the degree of regulation in accordance with their
own interests, the community of users will exercise its voice in order to prevent this.
In other words, the possibility of a balance of power between the different actors
involved in Internet governance is suggested. The idea of multistakeholderism as a
governance framework relying on the involvement of various actors is based on this
assumption, which also suggests that the public is one of the stakeholders in Internet
governance. Accordingly, the clash between the public interest and the interests of
governments should lead to a compromise-based policy.
In this light, we should ask two questions. The first is whether users are able to
exercise their voices in general and within authoritarian environments in particular.
The second is whether the user community has any independent voice to exercise.
The data from Russia suggests that an independent user voice scarcely exists, and
based on this data, one might not expect the community of users to oppose Internet
regulation in Russia. State governance of the Internet is not balanced by a separate
and sometimes oppositional voice of the public in the Russian case: it is largely
supported and empowered by the public.
For instance, recently, the Russian ministry of communication suggested
moving the management of .ru domains from the relatively independent Coordination
Center for TLD RU (http://www.cctld.ru/en/) to the ministry itself.18 Some experts
have suggested that this could be another step (although only one among many)
15
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toward stricter Internet regulation and part of a Russian policy to ensure that the
authorities have full control of the communication infrastructure. According to
IANA’s “Delegating or redelegating a country-code top-level domain (ccTLD)” rules,
those who ask for redelegation must demonstrate “that the request serves the local
Internet community’s interest.”19 This requirement, which is a reflection on ICANN’s
multistakeholderism policy, assumes the existence of a “local Internet community”
and its capacity to communicate its interests independently from state institutions. In
light of the data outlined above, it should be no surprise that there has been no
expression of opposition or protest against this move by the user community.
That said, there are some actors in Russia who vigorously oppose Internet
regulation. The Russian Pirate Party launched a special website, Roskomsvoboda
(http://rublacklist.net), to monitor new restrictions on Internet freedom and expose the
blacklist of banned websites managed by the Russian Ministry of Communication.
There is also an Association of Internet Users (http://freerunet.ru), as well as some
vocal independent bloggers, experts, software developers, journalists and managers of
online projects. All of these voices, however, have had very little impact on Russian
policy on Internet regulation, and, it seems, little impact on Russian public opinion. In
a small amount of cases, the Russian Association of Electronic Communication
(RAEC), which lobbies on behalf of Russian Internet companies and includes some
of the leading commercial actors in Runet, has tried to oppose some of the most
radical initiatives which may pose a significant threat to the business interests of
Internet companies. These efforts, however, also remain marginal, and RAEC avoids
any conflict with the Russian authorities. The surveys mentioned above underscore
this conclusion: those who oppose Internet regulation are marginal because they are in
opposition not only to the authorities but also to the majority of public opinion. The
Russian government feels free to introduce more and more initiatives to regulate the
Internet not just because there is little opposition, but because it is supported by the
public.
Even an authoritarian government such as Russia’s20 seeks legitimacy and
support from its citizens, and would not wish to run the risk of acting against strong
19
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public opinion. One possible implication is that those seeking to block radical
initiatives for Internet regulation should shift from exclusive attention on monitoring
the authorities and lamenting new restrictions and turn towards efforts to shape
public opinion and engage users about the protection of Internet freedom. A primary
way to slow regulation is by attempting to disturb the government’s perception that it
has full public support. To this end, it is important first to understand why the
majority of the public are loyal supporters of Internet regulation and of the idea that
these efforts should be led by the government.
4. Factors in public support for Internet regulation
While the data from the survey conducted by the IPO and VCIOM contradicts
the assumption that the public will automatically oppose restrictive Internet regulation
and online censorship, the question that needs to be asked is why the public supports
such interventions. How is the legitimacy of regulation achieved? Is the positive
attitude toward online censorship associated with people’s education, age, gender,
where they live, or the scale of their Internet usage?
The IPO survey provides some insights that may help us to respond to these
questions. On the one hand, one can argue that there is an association between the
scale of Internet usage and the attitudes toward censorship. According to the data,
76% of heavy Internet users and 61% of light Internet users thought that the Internet
had a positive effect on people’s lives, while only 21% of non-users shared this
attitude. Meanwhile, 55% of non-users thought that the Internet had a negative
impact, and only 23% of light and 15% of heavy Internet users agreed with this
perspective.21
Both surveys that are discussed in this article provide some data that
complicates the commonly held belief that urban populations, youth, and those with
higher education levels are more likely to oppose censorship and regulation. For
instance, the data from the Levada Center demonstrates that while the difference in
attitudes between different age, education, and location demographics is not
substantial, higher support for Internet censorship can be found among those living in
big cities (except Moscow), the younger group of respondents (18-24) tend to support
censorship more than the older group, people with higher education support
21
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regulation more than those with only school education, and woman support regulation
more than men.
The data from the IPO survey illustrates that there was little to no significant
difference between respondents from more urban and rural areas in their opposition to
the Internet’s temporary shutdown.22 In other words, the data from both surveys
suggest that demographic characteristics do not necessarily provide a good
explanation for differences in attitudes toward the Internet and the regulation of
cyberspace. That said, one of the most remarkable findings of the survey by the
Levada Center is a decline in support for Internet censorship over time. While in 2012
censorship was supported by 63% of respondents, the 2014 results showed only 54%
expressed the same opinion. Meanwhile, agreement with the idea that the threats
linked to the Internet are overestimated and there is no place for censorship grew from
19% to 31%.23 One can argue that the latter effect can be associated with increases in
the number of Internet users. Director of the Sakharov Center, Sergey Lukashevsky,
pointed out in an interview with Dozhd TV that support for censorship was
particularly significant among non-users. “I think it would not be audacious to suggest
a hypothesis that the decrease in support for censorship can be associated with the
increase in the number of advanced Internet users in Russia,” Lukashevsky argued.24
Nonetheless, alongside the arguments that suggest an association between the
scale of usage and the attitude toward Internet regulation, an alternative view suggests
that more substantial reasons for support for Internet censorship are related to Russian
political culture. Freedom of speech, Lukashevsky said, was not valued by the
majority of Russians. According to Aleksey Levinson of the Levada Center, most
Russians did not share the negative attitude toward censorship that can be found
among liberal intellectuals. 25 Moreover, he argued that Russians did not link the
banning of “dangerous” websites with a restriction of human rights, concluding, “A
very high number of people think that on the Internet, people can see things that they
22
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shouldn’t see and therefore welcome censorship. But in general Russians support
freedom of speech.”26 According to a sociologist from the Levada Center, respondents
tended to express a higher degree of opposition to political censorship.27 At the same
time, the data from the IPO survey demonstrates that various forms of political
censorship online were supported by pluralities of respondents, with support for
censorship greatest for online content depicting homosexuality or suicide.28
The picture derived from the data and the expert opinions is controversial. On
the one hand, the data allows us to argue that we are witnessing a positive
development associated with the increase in the number of the Internet users. In this
case, if adopting the hypothesis that more active users tend to be more opposed to
regulation and censorship, one can be relatively optimistic since various sets of data
demonstrate that older people and those living in rural areas in Russia are going
online in higher numbers than in the past. We can argue, however, that the problem is
not related to the number of Internet users, but to the normative dimension of a
Russian society that is less sensitive to censorship. In other words, frequency of
Internet usage is associated with attitudes about censorship, but Russian political
culture attenuates the impact of Internet usage on censorship attitudes.
One might suggest that the contradictions seen in the data are actually the
most valuable information contained in these surveys. The contradictions demonstrate
the degree of confusion and lack of knowledge about the role of the Internet among
the Russian population (and this is not necessarily directly or significantly associated
with Internet usage). Citizens in general, and Internet users specifically, do not have
strong views about the role, threats, or regulation of the Internet. In this state of
confusion and even ignorance, public opinion about the Internet can easily be
manipulated.
Lukashevsky points out that both the authorities and various social organizations that
are interested in control over society will continue to manipulate the issue of banning
child pornography to justify Internet censorship. Like any other technology, the
Internet is the subject of social construction by different actors. Those who follow the
development of the Internet in Russia can see a continuous policy of constructing the
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Internet as a threat and the Internet itself as a technology responsible for a variety of
social problems.
The social construction of the Internet in Russia includes linking it not only to
the problems of pornography and crime, but also to the increase in suicide attacks and
to “sexual minority propaganda” that poses a threat to family values. The Internet is
also framed as a technology that is used by foreign agents seeking to cause social and
political instability in Russia, and this is supported by the conspiracy theories mapped
by Andrey Soldatov, as well as in the results of the IPO survey itself.29 30The recent
conflict between Russia and Ukraine has contributed to the framing of the Internet as
an instrument of psychological and information warfare.
One of the phenomena that can be associated with the Russian construction of
the ‘Internet as Threat’ is the relative balance between the degrees of usage and trust
in traditional and new media. With regard to usage, central Russian TV dominates as
the number one source of information for 60% of all Russians and one of the three top
sources of information for 84% of all Russians. In comparison, online news sites were
selected as the primary source of information for only 10% and in the top three
sources of information by just 29% of Russians.31 Regarding trust, the IPO survey
also shows that, even amongst internet users, the degree of trust in television as a
source of information (88% trust TV news) is higher than the degree of trust in
Internet publications (75% of internet users).32
The Internet is not only a technology that can be used to introduce alternative
framings and to challenge state-affiliated discourses, but also something that has been
constructed and framed. It both constructs and is constructed. The statistics about trust
in different media suggest that TV will continue to dominate the framing of a variety
of topics, including the Internet, for Russian citizens. As long as the authorities
control the majority of TV stations in Russia, the way these stations construct the
Internet will contribute to shaping public opinion, including the opinions of Internet
users. There is a double advantage to this tactic for the traditional media in Russia,
particularly TV. Complicit with the state, they propagate the ‘Internet as Threat’
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narrative and legitimate its regulation, which keeps trust in the Internet low and
maintains the traditional media’s monopoly on shaping public opinion.
This dynamic between new and old media brings us back to the question of
whether the increase in the number of Internet users, and in particular the expansion
of Internet usage in rural areas and among older populations, can lead to substantial
change in public opinion toward the Internet. We continue to see more and more
Internet users, but the opinions of these users about the Internet are still shaped by the
traditional media and not necessarily by their own usage experience, and we should
not necessarily expect substantial change in attitudes toward Internet regulation as a
result of continuing Internet proliferation, but perhaps even an increase in support for
Internet regulation.
5. Bringing users back to the scene: Reframing of the Internet and alternative
imaginaries
While the increase in the number of Internet users is not expected to lead to
substantial changes in public opinion, there is another process that may be more
significant. This is the change not in the number of users, and not even in the
frequency of usage, but in the purpose and the practices of usage.
The IPO survey demonstrates that the most popular ways in which the Internet
is used by Russian respondents included searching for information for personal use
(63%), communicating in social networks (62%), downloading videos (37%) and
music (38%), reading national news (45%) and corresponding by e-mail (39%). Far
fewer respondents used the Internet in order to search for friends and people with
similar interests (15%), downloading/purchasing software or apps (15%), manage
finances online (12%) or to look for employment (10%). Only 1% of responders
wrote a blog.33
One should differentiate between the more instrumental, consumptive
functions of the Internet and more substantial, productive functions. The instrumental
functions support the everyday activities of users (for example, communication or
leisure) without significant change to their way of life. The substantial functions
include online production skills and activities such as writing a blog, posting videos,
33
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coding, or organizing new groups and identities online. These online activities allow
for the possibility of new forms of self-realization, skill acquisition, social
mobilization, as well as various forms of political activism. The framing of the
Internet only as a set of instrumental tools and resources for leisure coupled with the
narrative of the Internet as a significant threat to security, morals and stability, should
be challenged by what has been conceptualized by Mansell as alternative imaginaries
of the Internet.34 In her earlier work, Mansell applies Amartya Sen’s notion of
freedom as a realization of the individual’s own capabilities to the online world. She
argues for “the rights and entitlements of individuals to the opportunity to acquire
capabilities for effectively using the electronic spaces created by the new media to
strengthen their own freedom to decide between alternative ways of living.”35
In order to challenge the current framing of the Internet in Russia, we must
seek to promote an alternative imaginary that allows for the realization that the
Internet may have substantial, life-changing value for individuals, and this imaginary
should be used to balance the framing of the ‘Internet as Threat,’ with the realization
that Internet regulation is not only a way to address threats, but also something that
limits people’s opportunities. If users do not realize what they need the Internet for,
their understanding of the Internet will be dominated by the perception of the Internet
as a threat, and therefore in need of regulation. Challenging the current imaginaries
of the Internet should also be reflected through the practices of how people use the
Internet. Decreasing the degree of public support for regulation and understanding
that further regulation could erode public support may act as a bulwark against new
restrictions on cyberspace.
There are currently some examples of global initiatives to promote
imaginaries of the Internet that are focused on user empowerment. One of these
projects is the “Web We Want,” initiated by Sir Tim Berners Lee. According to the
project’s statement, it seeks to “connect and strengthen local groups, especially in the
developing world, building a movement to empower citizens to make, claim and
shape the Web they want both nationally and globally, so as to achieve the world we
want.”36 The vision of the project relies on “the UN Declaration of Human Rights and
34
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the goals of social justice.”37 This type of project can provide an opportunity for
challenging state-sponsored framings of cyberspace and changing public opinion
about the role of the Internet. It is important to note, however, that this type of
initiative should not transform into the “Web We Don’t Want” when discussion is
structured around threats that can be associated with the Internet (for example to
privacy or security).
6. It’s not only about Russia: International dimensions of internal public opinion
While this analysis is focused on Russia, the role of the Internet in shaping
public opinion and in justifying regulation goes far beyond any specific region or type
of political system. The Russian authorities would like the ‘Internet as Threat’
narrative to work externally on an international stage, just as it functions
domestically, 38 and Russian initiatives for institutional reforms (for example the
relocation of Internet governance from ICANN to ITU) are structured as a response to
a variety of threats. The internal model described here is also applicable in other
places around the world. Even most democratic states have actors and institutions
promoting a threat-driven framing of technologies in general and of the Internet in
particular, seeking to manipulate or increase public support for the introduction of
new forms of regulation. One problem with the multistakeholder model of Internet
governance is that the community of Internet users is one of the major stakeholders,
but not necessarily an independent or powerful one. A security-driven framing of the
Internet seeks to exclude the community of users even further.
Russian writer Evgeny Shvarts argues in his play The Dragon that it is not
enough to kill the Dragon in order to free people from his totalitarian rule--the
“dragon” has to be killed in each of the people who lived under the dragon’s rule.39
The struggle for Internet freedom is often focused on the institutional “dragons”
responsible for new forms of regulation. It also assumes that the public can actively
participate in protecting its own freedoms and act as a counterbalance to institutional
actors in the multistakeholder ecosystem. The data from Russian public opinion
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surveys contradict these assumptions and demonstrate that one of the fundamental
issues in Internet governance is the public support for Internet censorship.
This article has tried to argue that protecting Internet freedom is not possible
without a shift in public opinion. It requires both opposition to the state-sponsored
framing of the Internet and the expansion of Internet imaginaries beyond the focus on
security threats and leisure. Accordingly, the core struggle is not a struggle around
Internet regulation, but a struggle around the construction of the Internet’s role in the
everyday life of its users.

